The Flaws 

Consultation Flaws 1 

Our Question is: Who Really Runs Oxford Street?

The Mayor and TfL are proposing to pedestrianise Oxford Street West (OSW) and has now set up a new Mayoral Development Corporation (MDC) known as the Oxford Street Development Corporation  to “run” the street. Westminster Council were the legal owners of the road have now signed that legal ownership over to TfL But Westminster Council are still responsible for the day to day running of the street

So who would actually be in charge of day-to-day operations ifr this goes through?

The short answer is: nobody knows, because the powers they are relying on do not yet exist.

1. What the MDC definitely controls

Under the Localism Act 2011, an MDC automatically becomes the planning authority for its designated area.

That means:

• deciding planning applications;

• preparing the local plan for the area;

• controlling future development.

That’s all.

Nothing else transfers automatically.

2. What the MDC does not control unless special powers are transferred

All of the following remain under Westminster City Council (WCC) unless:

• WCC agrees to give them up;

• the Mayor drafts a legal Order; and

• the London Assembly approves it.

This includes:

• highway authority powers (street layout, maintenance, cleansing)

• loading, servicing and freight control

• traffic orders and access enforcement

• street trading and busking regulation

• bollard and HVM operation and responsibility

• pedicab enforcement

• waste and environmental enforcement

• CCTV, wardens and ASB control

None of these functions have been transferred.

No draft Order exists.

No consultation has happened on transferring WCC’s powers.

Yet the OSW consultation assumes the MDC will run all of the above.

3. What TfL controls (and cannot give to the MDC)

TfL retains:

• bus routes and bus stops

• traffic signals

• GLA roads

• strategic network management

• any future pedicab licensing regime (if legislated)

These powers cannot simply be handed to an MDC.

So the MDC  still depends on TfL for most of the transport network.

4. The problem: three bodies, no clarity

The OSW proposals assume:

• TfL designs the scheme,

• the MDC runs the street,

• WCC fixes the problems in side streets.

But none of this has been legally or operationally agreed.

We end up with:

• TfL (transport powers)

• WCC (highways & enforcement powers)

• MDC (planning powers only)

There is currently no single accountable body that could run a pedestrianised Oxford Street safely.

5. Why this matters for residents

The scheme relies heavily on:

• bollards and access control

• night-time servicing loops

• enforcement against pedicabs and unlicensed traders

• protection of vulnerable groups

• crime prevention and ASB management

• management of spillover traffic into Marylebone and Fitzrovia

But nobody has said:

• who would run these systems;

• who pays for them;

• who is liable if they fail;

• which body has the legal powers to enforce anything.

This is a fundamental flaw in the proposal.

6. Bottom line

Significance:

Read as a whole, the sequence shows a consultation closing before design principles are agreed, a Mayoral decision scheduled before planning powers formally transfer, and a summer “Day One” closure presented as a delivery milestone rather than a contingent option.

Until the Mayor publishes:

• a full MDC powers Order,

• a legally sound transfer of WCC functions, and

• a clear governance and funding model,

The OSW scheme is not operationally deliverable and not legally complete and therefore  fundamentally flawed and if it were to proceed in this state would be open to challenge

Consultation Flaws 2

Oxford Street West Pedestrianisation Summary of the Technical Assessment

1. Overview of the Proposal

• TfL and the Mayor propose full pedestrianisation of Oxford Street West (OSW) between Marble Arch and Orchard Street.

• All motor traffic would be removed between 07:00 and midnight, including buses and taxis.

• Servicing would only be allowed midnight–07:00, using gated “servicing loops”.

• A future Mayoral Development Corporation (MDC) is forecast to “run” Oxford Street.

Core finding:

The evidence provided does not show that this scheme is safe, workable, lawful, or beneficial to surrounding communities.

2. Key Problems Identified

2.1 Displacement of Traffic and Pollution

• Traffic does not disappear — it is pushed into:

  • Wigmore Street

  • Henrietta Place

  • Marylebone Lane

  • Great Portland Street

  • Residential side streets and school zones

• No full network-wide model has been provided.

• Air quality on narrower residential streets likely worsens.

3. Removal of Buses, Taxis and Key Transport Links

3.1 Bus Removal

• All buses removed from OSW, including routes:

  • 7 (St Mary’s Hospital link)

  • 22 (only bus through Mayfair)

  • 94 (main West London link)

• These routes are used by elderly, disabled passengers, night workers and hospital staff.

3.2 Electrification Changes the Argument

• Most buses on OSW are now electric or hybrid.

• Removing clean buses does not produce major environmental gains.

3.3 Night Workers

• 15,000–20,000 night-shift workers depend on night buses and taxis.

• Proposal harms those least able to absorb additional walking or transport cost.

4. Unsound Servicing and Freight Arrangements

4.1 Midnight–7am Delivery Window

• All deliveries moved to night hours:

  • Increased noise

  • Safety risks

  • Undermines disability/shift worker access

4.2 Loops, Bollards and Enforcement

• Scheme depends on:

  • rising bollards

  • strict access controls

  • reliable technology

  • real-time enforcement

• Local experience shows bollards frequently fail.

4.3 Side Street Pressure

• Daytime loading forced into:

  • Wigmore Street

  • James Street

  • North Audley Street

  • Great Castle Street

• These areas become congested, noisy, and unsafe.

5. Accessibility and Equalities Failures

5.1 Kerb-Free Design

• No kerbs + shared-space approach = unsafe for:

  • blind/visually impaired people

  • wheelchair users

  • neurodivergent users

  • older people

5.2 Poor EqIA

• Does not assess displaced traffic noise/pollution.

• Ignores night worker impacts.

• Assumes the MDC will provide solutions that have no legal basis.

5.3 Night-Time Risks

• Peak taxi usage is 01:00–03:00 (2018 data).

• Vulnerable users rely on direct access during these hours.

6. Safety, Security and Crime

6.1 Emergency Services

• Bollards and crowds delay access.

• No response-time modelling provided.

6.2 Crime & ASB

• Oxford Street has recently suffered:

  • organised retail crime

  • antisocial behaviour

  • international negative media coverage

• Pedestrianisation without policing plan risks worsening crime.

6.3 No Security Plan

• No CCTV strategy, policing commitments, or funding model.

7. Impact on Marylebone, Fitzrovia and Mayfair

(See Flaws 3 & 4 for more detailed assessments)

7.1 Wigmore Street

• Main “relief road” for displaced traffic.

• Narrow, residential, business mix area.

7.2 Great Portland Street & Fitzrovia

• Unmodelled in TfL documents.

• Huge conflicts between:

  • two-way buses

  • IKEA lorries (Gt Castle Street)

  • standing buses on Margaret Street

• Serious risk of gridlock.

7.3 Mayfair Escape routes

Although buses do not run through Mayfair, it will suffer considerable east west traffic displacement from vehicles that are not forced into the Wigmore St/ Henrietta Place route (buses etc.) looking for alternative less congested routes- taxis and commercial traffic through the area. The primary east- west corridor for this will be:

• Brook Street  

• Upper Brook Street  

• Grosvenor Street  

• Upper Grosvenor Street  

• Maddox Street  

7.3 Schools and Healthcare

• Increased traffic hits:

  • primary schools

  • nurseries

  • St Mary’s Hospital connections (route 7 cut)

8. Governance Failure: Who Runs Oxford Street?

(see Flaws 2 for more detail)

8.1 MDC Planning Powers Only

• By law, an MDC automatically gets only planning powers.

• All operational powers remain with WCC unless specifically transferred.

8.2 No Transfer of Powers

• WCC has not agreed to transfer:

  • highways

  • cleansing

  • enforcement

  • street trading

  • bollard operations

• No legal Order exists transferring these.

8.3 TfL Powers Stay with TfL

• Bus routes

• Signals

• GLA roads

• Network management

These cannot be given to an MDC.

8.4 Result: Three Bodies, No Clarity

• TfL → transport powers

• WCC → highways, enforcement

• MDC → planning onl

No single accountable operator exists

9. Legal and Procedural Defects

9.1 Consultation Failures (Gunning Principles)

• Not enough information for meaningful response.

• Key modelling and operational details withheld.

9.2 Public Sector Equality Duty Failures

• EqIA incomplete and inadequate.

• Protected groups not properly assessed.

9.3 MDC only created during the consultation

• Unlawful to consult on a scheme dependent on:

  • a body that did not exist when consultation commenced

  • insufficient detail therefore given on the MDC- called OSDC

  • powers that may never be granted

Recent case law (West Dulwich) reinforces this.

10. Summary Conclusions

10.1 The Scheme Is Not Deliverable

• Governance unclear

• Operations unsafe

• Servicing impractical

• Equalities breached

• Crime risks unmanaged

• Transport links severed

• Side-streets overloaded

• Modelling missing

10.2 What Is Needed Instead

• Full, transparent modelling

• A lawful EqIA

• A clearly defined governance model

• Realistic servicing arrangements

• Retention of essential bus links

• Community-led, evidence-based alternatives

• Consultation on actual, legally deliverable options

Without being in receipt of the above consultation is technically flawed and should be abandoned until such time as this information can be produced.

Consultation Flaws 3

OXFORD STREET WEST TRANSPORT PROPOSALS – Summary of Key Issues (Marylebone Area- including Fitzrovia)

1. Overview – What the Scheme Does

The Mayor/TfL proposals would:

• Close Oxford Street to vehicles 24/7 (except midnight–7am servicing)

• Divert all buses, taxis and traffic away from Oxford Street onto surrounding roads

• Introduce major new bus corridors on Wigmore Street, Henrietta Place, Margaret Street and Great Portland Street

• Reverse/alter several local one-way streets

• Force all daytime servicing onto side streets

• Create new pedestrian areas where all traffic must be displaced somewhere else

Although some streets will feel the impact more than others, the whole neighbourhood experiences knock-on effects, because Marylebone is a network of narrow, interconnected residential streets.

2. Key Issues for Residents – Across the Whole Area

(Even for those not directly next to the bus routes)

A. Traffic displacement into the residential grid

When Oxford Street is closed:

• Traffic movements redistribute into Wigmore St, Henrietta Place, Great Portland Street, Margaret Street.

• Overflow traffic will also use nearby links such as:

  • Welbeck Street

  • Wimpole Street

  • New Cavendish Street

  • Queen Anne Street

  • Bolsover Street / Hallam Street area

• Even if your street is quiet now, displacement from major routes inevitably spreads out through the grid, especially at peak times.

Residents on non-bus streets will likely see more:

• taxis rat-running

• private hire cut-throughs

• app-based drivers following Waze/Google diversions

• delivery vans seeking alternative routes

• general congestion backing up from the new bottlenecks

B. Much heavier bus activity on certain streets

Three streets take almost the entire bus network:

1. Wigmore Street

• Up to 23 buses per hour each way daytime

• Up to 14 buses per hour each way at night

• Two-way movement replaces today’s quieter pattern

2. Great Portland Street

• Up to 28 buses per hour each way daytime

• 56 in total each hour — one nearly every minute

• Night-time flows still high (11 per hour each way)

3. Margaret Street / Henrietta Place loop

• Sharp turns, narrow geometry

• Buses performing 90° manoeuvres in tight spaces

Impact for the wider area:

Even if you don’t live on these streets, they influence the noise, flow, and congestion patterns across all surrounding roads.

C. Increased night-time disturbance

Because buses and servicing are forced off Oxford Street:

• Night buses (00:30–06:00) now run on residential side streets

• Servicing vehicles (HGVs, waste lorries) also use those same streets

• Night-time is quietest: noise travels furthest

Residents across Marylebone may notice:

• braking/engine noise echoing from Wigmore/GPS

• more night-time vehicle movements on connecting streets

• more siren activity as emergency vehicles reroute around blockages

• reversing alarms from HGVs servicing shops via Welbeck/Margaret St

D. Servicing displacement onto side streets

Because Oxford Street only allows deliveries midnight–7am:

• All day-time servicing for shops, cafés, offices and hotels must shift to side streets.

• These include Wigmore Street, Welbeck Street, Henrietta Place, Holles Street, Margaret Street.

Impacts for nearby residents even if not on the route:

• frequent HGV presence in the wider grid

• congestion from lorries blocking junctions

• noise from cage deliveries and tail-lifts

• obstruction of pavements

• more delivery vans circulating the area looking for access

E. Junction stress & risk increases

Several junctions will experience higher turning pressure:

• Great Portland Street / Margaret Street

• Great Portland Street / Great Castle Street

• Wigmore / Welbeck

• Wigmore / Marylebone Lane (westbound re-entry)

• Cavendish Square north & east arm

Effects on the wider area:

• queues spilling back into nearby streets

• increased horn use and driver frustration

• pedestrians diverted or squeezed

• knock-on congestion blocking approaches further out

F. More pressure on quiet residential streets

While some residents assume “my street won’t be affected because no buses come here”, the real pressure comes from everyone else escaping the new bottlenecks.

Expect more activity on:

• New Cavendish St (east–west)

• Welbeck St (north–south)

• Wimpole St and Upper Wimpole

• Hallam St, Bolsover St, Gosfield St

• Harley Street north of Wigmore

None of these gain bus routes — but they do gain:

• more circulating traffic

• more mis-routed taxi/PVH drivers

• spillover queues

• more delivery vans searching for access

• potentially more noise at night due to diversion patterns

3. Wider Community Impacts

A. Safety concerns

• More buses and HGVs turning through constrained streets

• Worst collision risk occurs at junctions where buses make sharp 90° turns

• Night-time visibility issues when buses share streets with servicing HGVs

• Increased risk for pedestrians crossing side streets

B. Noise & amenity

Even if your street is not a diversion corridor:

• general area noise level rises

• sound reflects in the Marylebone street canyon network

• night-time movements become more noticeable

C. Air quality

• Oxford Street improves — but pollution is simply relocated

• Wigmore Street, GPS, Welbeck and the surrounding grid experience higher emissions

• Air drift moves pollutants northward and westward into the residential blocks

D. Accessibility issues

• Some disabled residents and older people face longer vehicle routes

• Taxi access becomes more circuitous

• Increased walking distances to remaining bus routes

• 
  

4. Summary – What Residents Need to Know

Even if buses do not pass your front door:

The scheme fundamentally reshapes traffic across Marylebone.

It introduces:

• A major two-way bus corridor where none existed

• Heavy night-time bus movements

• Displaced HGV servicing into residential side streets

• Higher congestion pressure

• New rat-running patterns

• More noise travelling outwards from Wigmore/GPS

• Increased stress at key junctions

• Reduced access for taxis and private vehicles

The effects spread far wider than the streets with buses.

Because Marylebone’s streets are narrow, residential and interconnected, any major change on one corridor affects the whole grid. 

The consultation is consistently misleading with regard to the multiple downsides that come with the closure of Oxford Street; indeed, it even claims that the proposals will bring benefits for residents. By withholding the true facts and deliberately obscuring unpalatable truths, the consultation is misleading and fails to comply with the legal requirements that administrative bodies must adhere to when consulting. The consultation is therefore flawed and invalid.

Consultation Flaws 4

OXFORD STREET WEST TRANSPORT PROPOSALS – Summary of Key Issues (Mayfair/ St James Area)

The Mayor’s proposed Oxford Street West pedestrianisation closes the road to all traffic, forcing buses, taxis, delivery vans, HGVs and servicing vehicles to find alternative routes around Oxford Street.

Although no new bus routes enter Mayfair, the area is strongly affected because the road network around Marble Arch is being reconfigured — including reversing North Audley Street and Park Street, and adding a new bus stop on North Row. Wigmore Street will be cluttered with all the buses, so the taxis will divert through the nearest parallel routes in Mayfair: Brook Street and Upper Brook Street will be on the front line.

The proposal doesn’t consider the cumulative effect of the proposed changes of the public realm including partial pedestrianization in Regent’s Street, Haymarket and Piccadilly; which will create additional pressures on smaller residential streets, causing 24/7 noise, increasing air pollution, and endangering public safety by restricting access to emergency vehicles.

These changes fundamentally reshape local traffic patterns and significantly affect residential amenity, specifically air quality and noise. This will be especially problematic during proposed servicing hours for Oxford Street at night.

2. Key Road Changes Affecting Mayfair

A. North Audley Street – Traffic Reversed to Northbound

Currently southbound, North Audley Street is a long-standing bypass for traffic avoiding Marble Arch.

Under the proposal it will become northbound, meaning:

• southbound traffic can no longer pass into North Audley Street  

• queues from Marble Arch will now extend downward into Mayfair  

• northbound vehicles feed into congestion at the Oxford Street crossing  

• private hire vehicles (PHVs) and taxis begin circulating in the surrounding grid looking for escape routes  

• displaced pedicabs and bikes will increase congestion, noise, asb and crime

Rather than solving a rat-run, this relocates congestion into residential Mayfair.

B. Park Street – New Flow Direction Creates a North–South Route

Reversal of Park Street creates a new north–south corridor, feeding traffic into:

• Green Street  

• Upper Brook Street  

• Lees Place  

• North Row  

• Park Lane approaches

Impacts:

• increased taxi and PHV use  

• more servicing vans using Park Street as a bypass, especially during night

• new pressure at the Park Street → Green Street junction  

Park Street becomes a through-route rather than a residential street with increased air pollution, noise, asb and crime.

C. Green Street – Congestion Issues

While southbound vehicles from Park Street can turn right into Green Street and reach Park Lane, in practice:

• Green Street is narrow, heavily parked and obstructed by deliveries  

• the Park Lane junction is highly constrained  

• only a slow left turn is possible  

• queues often back up eastwards  

Drivers therefore avoid Green Street or abandon it mid-route entirely.

Result:  

Drivers circulate inside Mayfair, making multiple loops rather than exiting quickly. This results in increased congestion, air pollution and noise.

D. New Bus Stand on North Row

Although buses do not run through Mayfair, TfL proposes a new bus stand in North Row at the top of North Audley Street for curtailed West End routes. This will be located directly outside a large residential block.

This brings:

• high footfall on narrow pavements  

• late-night waiting passengers  

• noise and queuing near residential buildings  

• PHV/taxi clustering  

• increased litter, loitering and anti-social behaviour  

This dramatically alters the street environment.

D. Increased pressure on East/ West Corridors

Although buses do not run through Mayfair, it will suffer considerable east west traffic displacement from vehicles that are not forced into the Wigmore St/ Henrietta Place route (buses etc.) looking for alternative m=less congested routes- taxis and commercial traffic through the area. The primary east- west corridor for this will be

•  Brook Street  

• Upper Brook Street  

• Grosvenor Street  

• Upper Grosvenor Street  

• Maddox Street  

3. Anticipated Impacts for Residents

Oxford Street itself is heavily residential on the south (Mayfair) side, so huge numbers of residents will be affected by pedestrianisation and the dramatic increase in night-time economy activity planned for Oxford Street.

A. Increased Traffic & Circulation

The combination of road reversals and Oxford Street’s closure will create:

• increased north–south through-traffic  

• taxis and PHVs repeatedly looping around Park Street, Green Street, Upper Brook Street, Lees Place and North Row  

• displaced servicing traffic especially at night-time

• vehicles attempting to rejoin Park Lane or Oxford Street from within the residential grid  

Mayfair becomes a movement corridor, not a relatively calm residential quarter.

B. Noise & Pollution

Residents should expect:

• higher NO₂ and PM₂.₅ from idling vehicles  

• evening and late-night PHV noise  

• congestion-related engine revving  

• echoing noise in Georgian “canyon” streets  

These effects will be most felt on:

• North Audley Street  

• Park Street  

• Green Street east end  

• Upper Brook Street  

• North Row  

• Lees Place

• Duke Street

• St James’s street

C. Safety Risks

Changes introduce several new risks:

• drivers unfamiliar with new one-way patterns  

• conflict at narrow junctions  

• PHVs stopping unpredictably  

• delivery vehicles struggling with tight corners  

• pedestrians crossing in the wrong direction out of habit  

These risks are particularly acute at:

• Park Street ↔ Green Street  

• North Audley ↔ Upper Berkeley  

• Lees Place ↔ both N. Audley & Park Street

D. Pedestrian & Pavement Pressure

The new TfL bus stop generates:

• increased footfall  

• higher kerbside obstruction  

• more taxis stopping in prohibited places  

• more activity outside residential buildings, day and night  

Even without bus traffic, Mayfair will become busier and less residential.

4. Servicing Displacement into Mayfair

Because Oxford Street will only permit servicing between midnight and 7am, all daytime deliveries must use surrounding streets. This inevitably pushes more:

• HGVs  

• supermarket lorries  

• restaurant/hotel deliveries  

• waste and recycling vehicles  

• courier vans  

into the Mayfair network, especially:

• Park Street  

• Green Street east end  

• North Row  

• Upper Brook Street  

This increases:

• air pollution

• noise (tail-lifts, cage movements)  

• congestion at narrow junctions  

• pavement obstruction  

• night-time HGV activity for certain businesses  

5. A ‘24-Hour Economy’

The Mayor’s Development Corporation is formed with the specific purpose of accelerating growth across the entire MDC area. And by “growth”, the Mayor means developing a 24-hour economy in the Oxford Street area — effectively by extending licensing hours and allowing far more nightclubs, restaurants and bars to stay open for longer. In short, the proposal aims to implement the current Soho model along Oxford Street, using adjacent roads as service and dispersal areas to support this expansion.

This will increase:

• air pollution and noise (loading movements, late-night servicing)  

• anti-social behaviour and crime

• pavement obstruction  

• all forms of night-time activity, including cars and taxis  

7. Summary

Although no bus routes are diverted through Mayfair, the area faces serious indirect impacts:

• traffic flow reversals draw congestion into Mayfair  

• PHVs, taxis and vans circulate through residential streets  

• Green Street cannot absorb displaced flows 

• new bus stop brings public transport activity onto residential doorsteps  

• pavement crowding, noise and pollution increase  

• servicing is pushed into smaller residential side streets  

• road safety worsens at several junctions  

• large increase in anti-social behaviour from pedestrianisation and potentially crime

• large increase in nuisance from the 24-hour economy  

• local democracy is weakened through the MDC  

These proposals reshape movement throughout Mayfair/ St James’s without offering any direct benefit to residents.

The consultation is consistently misleading with regard to the multiple downsides that come with the closure of Oxford Street; indeed, it even claims that the proposals will bring benefits for residents. Can we ask for the basis of this claim? By withholding the true facts and deliberately obscuring unpalatable truths, the consultation is misleading and fails to comply with the legal requirements that administrative bodies must adhere to when consulting. The consultation is therefore flawed and invalid.

Consultation Flaws 5

Problems with the Oxford Street Development Corporation

Notes on Inaugural Board Meeting (Extraordinary Meeting)

Held: 7 January 2026

Status: Informal consolidated note (drawn from webcast observations, contemporaneous notes, and presentation slides)

1. Meeting status and procedure

The meeting was formally convened as an extraordinary meeting. Five clear working days’ notice was not given because the Corporation did not come into legal existence until 1 January 2026 and was required to meet urgently to approve foundational matters. This procedural context was explicitly stated at the outset.

2. Board composition and attendance (as noted)

The Board comprised a mix of retail, commercial, cultural, and public-sector figures, including representatives from Westminster City Council and Camden Council. Westminster representation was notable for the absence of Stuart Love (apologies given) and for an unusually candid intervention from Councillor Adam Hug, who stated that Westminster had a different vision and “would rather this body didn’t exist”, while committing to pragmatic engagement to ensure local voices were heard.

Senior GLA officers present included interim executive leadership and senior City Hall staff involved in the Corporation’s rapid establishment.

3. Opening framing and tone

The Mayor’s opening remarks set a strongly rhetorical and delivery-focused tone. Oxford Street was framed as a national economic asset (c. £25bn annual contribution cited), with repeated assertions that pedestrianisation leads to increased footfall, reduced crime, and long-term legacy benefits. The removal of traffic was described as previously “transformative”.

Board members were encouraged to see their role as exciting and creative, using language such as “Avengers” and “superheroes”. The overall atmosphere was affirmatory and enthusiastic, with little visible challenge to the central narrative.

4. Programme, timetable and milestones (from presentation slides)

The presentation slides set out a compressed and sequential delivery programme, which materially sharpens the implications of the verbal discussion.

Key milestones presented were:

• 16 January: Closure of consultation on traffic and highway changes

• End January: Public realm design principles agreed

• February: Design work commences on the whole-street vision and Oxford Street West

• March:

  • Mayoral decision post-consultation

  • Enabling works commence

• Late March – early May: Explicitly identified pre-election period

• 1 April: MDC assumes planning powers from Westminster and Camden (red line area)

• 7 May: Local elections

• May: Design work completed for the Oxford Street West transitional scheme

• Summer:

  • Highway closes to traffic (“Day One”), stated to be “subject to consultation”

  • Works begin on the transitional scheme

The slides also stated that “ongoing stakeholder engagement (including with businesses and communities) and communications activity” would run throughout the programme.

Significance:

Read as a whole, the sequence shows consultation closing before design principles are agreed, a Mayoral decision scheduled before planning powers formally transfer, and a summer “Day One” closure presented as a delivery milestone rather than a contingent option.

5. 2026 workstreams (from presentation slides)

The slides identified five core workstreams for 2026:

1. Design and delivery of capital works, including:

   • Completion of traffic and highway consultation and Mayoral decision

   • Design of both transitional and permanent public realm schemes

   • Delivery (stated to be “subject to consultation”) of the transitional scheme, including enabling works and improvements to Oxford Street East

1. Commercial and fundraising strategy

2. Events and activations, including planning and delivery

3. Planning service set-up, anticipated to be operational from 1 April

4. Continuing MDC establishment, covering recruitment, premises, and governance

Significance:

The prominence of commercial strategy and events/activation alongside core infrastructure and planning functions reinforces the impression that economic activation is a central organising principle, not a secondary outcome.

6. Consultation and engagement

While consultation was repeatedly referenced, both the tone of discussion and the structure of the timetable suggest it is positioned within a largely pre-defined programme. Design principles are shown as being agreed before consultation outcomes are reflected in Mayoral decisions, and delivery milestones are fixed well in advance.

A commitment was given that by the next Board meeting there would be a clearer process for resident engagement, implying that such mechanisms were not yet settled at the point key milestones were being agreed.

Camden’s representative stressed cross-boundary impacts (Fitzrovia, cycling routes, TfL coordination, British Museum access) and the need for wider community benefit, indicating concerns about displacement and network effects.

7. Financial governance and budget treatment

The meeting papers and notes indicate that:

• The Board was asked only to note high-level budget information.

• Detailed financial figures were deferred to a closed session, with press and public formally excluded.

• Funding for core transport and public realm works was acknowledged as uncertain, with reliance on commercial strategy and partnerships identified as mitigation.

Equality duties were referenced, but reliance appeared to be placed on existing EqIAs prepared for earlier consultations, rather than fresh assessments aligned to the OSDC’s own budget and delivery decisions as a new planning authority.

8. Overall assessment (from the combined record)

Taken together, the webcast observations, contemporaneous notes, and presentation slides support the following conclusions:

• The inaugural meeting framed the OSDC primarily as a delivery vehicle operating at pace, rather than as a body weighing open-ended options.

• Consultation is described as ongoing, but the critical sequencing (consultation closure → design agreement → Mayoral decision → planning power transfer → delivery) suggests limited scope for consultation to influence fundamentals.

• Financial scrutiny and transparency were constrained from the outset, with meaningful budget detail reserved to private session.

• Commercial activation and events play a central role in the programme, alongside pedestrianisation and public realm works.

• There is explicit evidence of unease from Westminster representatives, notwithstanding commitments to pragmatic engagement

Timeline

• Recruitment “at pace”.

• Intention to locate the team on or near Oxford Street.

• Stage 1 design principles already agreed.

• Detailed design scheduled for February.

• March: decision point on street closure; work on bus stops and taxis.

• April: planning processes to begin.

• May: design work completed, subject to Board consideration of closure.

• Summer: closure of Oxford Street to traffic.

• Day 1 closure envisaged as a “transitional scheme”, with rapid implementation.

• Longer-term vision of phased or progressive pedestrianisation of other parts of the street.

Notes taken from the inaugural OSDC Board meeting, supported by the presentation shown to members

Conclusion

It is clear from the initial meeting of the OSDC Board that there is only one direction of travel: the closure of Oxford Street. The consultation that was still in progress and ostensibly intended to inform that decision was either completely ignored or its outcome taken for granted. The Board therefore exhibited complete predetermination of the decision, rendering the consultation process effectively pointless and placing it in breach of the Gunning Principles, under which administrative bodies must undertake consultations. Where those principles are not complied with, the process is fundamentally flawed and therefore unlawful.